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TRAPPED IN A TANGLED WEB
UNITED STATES V. LARA: THE TROUBLE
WITH TRIBES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY
DEBACLE
MacKenzie T. Batzer*
Stretched across the upper part of the doorway was a big spiderweb,
and hanging from the top of the web, head down, was a large grey
spider. She was about the size of a gumdrop. She had eight legs . . .
“I’m not as flashy as some . . . but I’m near-sighted.”1

INTRODUCTION
Indigenous peoples have been present on United States soil
even before the nation became independent.
When the
Europeans came to the country and attempted to colonize the
Indigenous peoples, conflict inevitably arose, and the colonizers
were victorious in transforming tribes from self-governing bodies
abundant with rich traditions and cultural innovations to timid
groups at the mercy of white settlers. The transformation
“manifested itself through tremendous loss of life and land” and
established a “boundary line between the Indigenous and colonial
societies.”2 Relations between Indian tribes and the United
States government have continued to be unstable and ill-defined
since colonization. The status of Indian tribes relative to the
federal government has been difficult to characterize because
tribes do not possess the same sovereign power as the states.3
Indians and Indian reservations make up a larger portion of
the United States than most people realize. In Washington,
* JD/MBA candidate, 2007, Chapman University School of Law and Chapman University
Argyros School of Business & Economics, Orange, California. Thank you to Professor
Timothy A. Canova of the Chapman University School of Law for all of your guidance.
Thank you to Dr. Theodore, Dorothy, Zoe, Bree, Theo, and the Honorable James M.
Batzer, Tive Robertson, and last but most certainly not least, Rose Batzer. All of you
mean the world to me. Thank you for everything.
1 E.B. WHITE, CHARLOTTE’S WEB 36-37 (Harper & Row, Inc. 1952),
2 Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
75, 78 (2002).
3 See generally Alexander Reichert, Counsel for Billy Jo Lara, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
285 (2003/2004).
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Oregon, and Idaho alone, there are forty-two federally recognized
tribes that occupy over 5.6 million acres of land.4 Washington
tribes employ 15,000 Indian and non-Indian people.5 Indian
reservations across the United States generate $246 million in
tax revenue each year for state and local governments, in
addition to $4.1 billion in tax revenue for the federal
government.6 Additionally, there are over 250 tribal courts in
the United States today.7
Given the increasing financial power and political influence
of Indian tribes and the growing impact they have on non-Indian
citizens, it is becoming increasingly important to identify Indian
tribes’ roles within the United States. That is, what civil or
criminal control do Indian tribes have over their own members,
over other Indians who are not members of their tribes, and over
non-Indians? Additionally, what powers do Indian tribes possess
under the laws of the federal government? Moreover, if Congress
and the United States Supreme Court have the authority to
make and to interpret law with regard to Indian tribes, then to
what extent are Indian tribes sovereign?
Before colonization, Indian tribes were self-governing.
However, after Europeans arrived in the New World, they began
to introduce, and in many cases force, their values onto the
Indians. Tribes were stripped of some of their power, and
Indians began the struggle to preserve their own beliefs,
cultures, and ways of life. While some Indians welcomed change
and facilitated interaction between tribes and European
colonists, and while some Indigenous peoples and Europeans
believed both groups were on equal footing, most Europeans
believed they were superior to the Indians.8 Conflicting views
among the colonists and the Indigenous peoples “resulted in the
weakening, and in some cases, the extinction, of the Indigenous
peoples, and the commensurate empowerment of the colonizing
peoples.”9
Even though colonists, and eventually the United States
Supreme Court and Congress, began referring to Indian tribes as
“sovereign,” their actions with regard to the tribes speak louder
than words.
The acknowledgment of tribes as sovereign
4 Dan Murdock, Ethical Implications in Indian Law, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 313, 313
(2003/2004).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 313-14.
7 Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts: Applying the Myths and the
Methods of Marbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts’ Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
77, 103-04 (2004).
8 Porter, supra note 2, at 79.
9 Id. at 78.
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“increasingly looks like lip service,”10 while Congress’ plenary
power over tribes serves “as a continuing reminder that the
United States controls the Indian nations, very much like the
way prison guards serve as a constant reminder to the convicts
that they are not staying at the Holiday Inn.”11
Arising out of this sovereignty debacle is the question of
what constitutes a separate sovereign for purposes of Double
Jeopardy in criminal prosecution. A recent Supreme Court
decision attempts to clarify the issue, but only muddies the
waters. United States v. Lara12 demonstrates Congress’ and the
Supreme Court’s continued refusal to truly recognize Indian
tribes as sovereigns. Part I of this note reviews the history of
Indian tribal relations with the United States government that
has given rise to the present status of Indian tribes. Part II of
this note discusses the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, its
subsequent 1990 amendment, and the implications of this
amendment on Indian tribes’ rights to criminally prosecute their
own members as well as nonmember Indians. Part III of this
note summarizes United States v. Lara, examines the issue of
tribal sovereignty in the context of Lara, and analyzes the
implications of the Court’s decision on the future of tribal
sovereignty.
I
A.

HISTORY OF INDIAN TRIBAL RELATIONS WITH THE
UNITED STATES

What is Indian Country?

Spiders catch their prey with their legs and use their fangs to
inject poison.
“The relation of the Indians to the United States is marked
by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else.”13
King George’s Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the first instance
in which the term “Indian country” was used to separate Indianinhabited land from land owned by the colonists.14 Of course,
this was also an effort to by the government to gain centralized
control over Indigenous peoples by segregating them from white
settlers.15 Still, the Crown understood that any person who

Id. at 84.
Id. at 86.
541 U.S. 193 (2004).
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831).
Joseph D. Matal, A Revisionist History of Indian Country, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 283,
289 (1997).
15 Id.
10
11
12
13
14
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ventured into “Indian country” did so at his own risk.16
After the United States became independent, it preserved
the concepts of Indian country and centralized control because
the government’s goal was to “prevent Indian uprisings and
preserve the peace along the frontier.”17 The United States
concocted the first formal definition of “Indian country” through
the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1796.18 It amended the
Act in 1834 to include a newer, more accurate definition of Indian
country after treaties and Indian removal rendered the borders
The new, but perhaps
set by the 1796 Act obsolete.19
unimproved, definition characterized Indian country as:
[A]ll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not
within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the
Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the Indian title
has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this act, be taken and
deemed to be the Indian country.20

The government continued to push Indian tribes westward
and away from white settlers and citizens, and subsequently
decided to settle the Indians on reservations within new states.21
In 1874, the Indian Intercourse Act was repealed.22 However,
since the government moved Indian tribes within state borders,
it was inevitable that conflicts between states and the tribes
would develop.23 Therefore, Congress decided to make Indian
reservations “enclaves of exclusive federal jurisdiction” by
requiring cessation of state jurisdiction over Indian land.24
One of the first cases in which the Supreme Court attempted
to define Indian country was Ex Parte Crow Dog.25 In Crow Dog,
the Supreme Court characterized Indian country as all territory
“‘to which the Indian title has not been extinguished,’ and which
were either outside ‘the exterior geographical limits of a state’ or
‘excepted from its jurisdiction . . . at the time of its admission.’”26
As Indian country and state territory continued to collide,
the government passed the General Allotment Act of 1887, a
Id.
Mashpee Tribe v. Watt, 542 F. Supp. 797, 803 (D. Mass. 1982) (citing Mohegan
Tribe v. State of Conn., 638 F.2d 612, 621 (2nd Cir. 1980)).
18 4 Cong. Ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469 (1796). See also Matal, supra note 14, at 290.
19 23 Cong. Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834). See also Matal, supra note 14, at 290.
20 Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 734.
21 Matal, supra note 14, at 290. See, e.g., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369
U.S. 60 (1962).
22 Matal, supra note 14, at 291.
23 Id. at 295.
24 Id. at 293.
25 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
26 Matal, supra note 14, at 301 (quoting Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 561).
16
17
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comprehensive piece of legislation allowing Indians fractional
interests in land.27 The General Allotment Act, also known as
the Dawes Act, gave the President the power to allocate tribal
lands to individual Indians.28 Under the original General
Allotment Act, Indians could purchase plots of 160 acres, and
white settlers could purchase any left over land.29 However, the
allotments were held in trust by the United States for a
minimum of twenty-five years.30 After the Supreme Court
decision in another case involving tribes, In re Heff31, and several
subsequent revisions of the General Allotment Act, the Indian
Reorganization Act ended the allotment policy in 1934.32
However, the General Allotment Act had far-reaching adverse
consequences on the treatment of Indian country and tribal
sovereignty because “the Court no longer considered tribal
governments to exist, and it no longer viewed Indian lands as
having unique jurisdictional status.”33
In 1948 the United States codified the definition of Indian
country:
[T]he term “Indian country” . . . means (a) all land within the limits of
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.34

Following this codification, there was a plethora of court
cases that sought to interpret the term “Indian country,” focusing
on a variety of factors. It seemed as if neither courts nor
Congress had a consistent idea of what Indian country was, or
what jurisdiction Indians or the government had over crimes
committed in Indian country.

27 See generally FELIX COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
(Rennard Strickland & Charles F. Wilkinson eds., Michie 1982), for an overview of several
sections of the General Allotment Act and other pieces of legislation affecting it, as well as
a comprehensive history of Indian relations with the government.
28 Matal, supra note 14, at 306 (citing Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24
Stat. 388 (1887)).
29 Id. (citing 24 Stat. 388, 390).
30 COHEN, supra note 27, § 2.C.
31 197 U.S. 488 (1905).
32 Matal, supra note 14, at 307.
33 Id.
34 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948).
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Trouble at the Court

The poison contains an agent that assists in dissolving the
prey so the spider can consume it.
Since the Constitution gives very little guidance on Congress’
power to regulate Indian affairs, in early cases the Supreme
Court was forced to look outside the Constitution to make
decisions about the power of Indian tribes to own and use land,
their status as sovereigns, and their self-governance. Three
cases that have come to be known as the “Marshall trilogy”
provided yet another Supreme Court interpretation of the status
of Indian tribes in the United States.35
In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the plaintiffs, British subjects and
their heirs, claimed title to property conveyed to them by the
Indians.36 The defendants, on the other hand, received their title
directly from the United States government. Both claimed that
their title was superior.37 The Court concluded that even though
Indian tribes held title to land, the United States had superior
title.38 Therefore, the white settlers who had title conveyed by
the U.S. government were permitted to purchase and sell the
land, while tribes retained only the right to occupy and use it.39
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court held that Indian
tribes were “domestic dependent nations.”40 However, the Court
at the same time acknowledged that tribal self-government was
important, laying the foundation for future conflicts over tribal
autonomy.41 The following year, in Worcester v. Georgia, the
Court held that Georgia state laws did not have an effect within
Cherokee Nation territorial boundaries and referred to tribes as,
“distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights.”42 Through this language, the Court
again appeared to express the importance of tribal selfUnfortunately, neither the Court nor the
governance.43
government expounded on what they believed these “original
35 See generally Frank Pommersheim, Native Americans and the Constitution: Is
There a (Little or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing In Indian Law?: A Brief
Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271 (2003). The three cases, Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), are known as the “Marshall trilogy” because the
opinions in each were delivered by Justice Marshall. Id.
36 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 571-605.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
41 Pommersheim, supra note 35, at 275.
42 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
43 Pommersheim, supra note 35, at 275.
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natural rights” to be.
Clearly, issues of Indian tribal sovereignty and tribes’
relationships to the government were abundant. In Ex Parte
Crow Dog, the Supreme Court not only sought to define Indian
country but also sought to determine whether federal statutes
and treaties had extended criminal jurisdiction to cover crimes
committed by one Indian against another in Indian territory.44
Crow Dog was convicted of murdering Spotted Tail, an Indian
from a different tribe.45 The murder took place in Sioux territory,
but under Sioux law Crow Dog’s punishment would have been
limited to his support of Spotted Tail’s family.46 The Court’s
opinion in Ex Parte Crow Dog addressed the issue specifically in
reference to Sioux territory, but the opinion had a fartherreaching impact because of its holding and broad language.
While the Court held that federal courts did not have jurisdiction
to hear intra-state Indian criminal affairs, the Court thought
that Indians should be judged, “by the customs of their people
[and] the law of their land,” and vacated Crow Dog’s federal
conviction.47 There was such a public outcry following this
decision that Congress passed the Indian Major Crimes Act,
under which Indians who committed serious felonies, even within
Indian territory, could be tried in federal court.48
Three years later, in United States v. Kagama, the Court
upheld Congress’ ability to enact the Indian Major Crimes Act
and reaffirmed the notion that states did not have legislative
power over Indian tribes, because the federal government had
that power.49 Kagama has come to be known as the foundation of
Congress’ plenary power over Indian tribes.50 The Court stated
that the “power of the general government over these remnants
of a race once powerful”51 is broad and plenary because “it alone
can enforce its laws on all the tribes.”52
109 U.S. 556 (1883).
Id. at 557.
Matal, supra note 14, at 303 (citing COHEN, supra note 27, at § 4.A).
Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571-72.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000). See also Matal, supra note 14, at 303. The original
version of the Indian Major Crimes Act allowed for federal prosecution of Indians for
seven named offenses committed throughout organized territories and on Indian
reservations. Today, the Act provides for federal prosecution of fourteen named offenses
committed within Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. These offenses include, but are not
limited to, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, incest, assault with intent to
commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily
injury, assault against an individual under 16 years of age, arson, burglary, and robbery.
Id.
49 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
50 Matal, supra note 14, at 305.
51 118 U.S. at 384.
52 Id. at 385.
44
45
46
47
48
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In the mid-to-late 1900s, the issue of tribal sovereignty again
began to mix with the issues of criminal prosecution and
jurisdiction.
In Ophilant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the
Supreme Court held that tribal governments had lost inherent
jurisdiction over non-Indians, and stated that when tribal land
became part of United States territory, Indian tribes’ rights as
completely independent, sovereign nations were diminished.53
However, the Court left open the question of whether tribes had
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
II. DURO V. REINA AND THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968
“I always give them a little anesthetic so they won’t feel pain.
It’s a little service I throw in.”54
In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA).55 Also known as the Indian Bill of Rights, the ICRA
imposes certain constitutional restrictions upon Indian tribal
governments and guarantees Indians’ basic civil rights.56 The
ICRA also requires that defendants in tribal court be accorded
most of the protections that the Constitution extends to
defendants in state and federal court, and provides for federal
habeas review of tribal court convictions.”57 Additionally, the
ICRA guarantees tribal members equal protection.58
The 1968 version of the ICRA repeatedly uses the phrase
“any person” in connection with its various sections. The original
interpretation of the Act, however, was not meant to imply that
“Indian tribes can exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.”59
A turning point for tribes everywhere took place with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Duro v. Reina and Congress’ actions
after the Court handed down its decision.60 The events in Duro
took place on the Salt River Indian Reservation just east of
Scottsdale, Arizona.61 Albert Duro was an enrolled member of a
different tribe, the Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission
Indians.62 Between March and June 1984, he resided on the Salt
River Indian Reservation with a female companion who was a

435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
E.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 48.
25 U.S.C.. §§ 1301 et. seq. (1968).
41 AM. JUR. 2d Indians § 13.
Brief for the United States at 34, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (No.
03-107) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1968)).
58 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1968).
59 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indians § 13 (West 2004).
60 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
61 Id. at 679.
62 Id.
53
54
55
56
57
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member of the Salt River Tribe.63 In June 1984, Duro shot and
killed a fourteen-year-old boy on the Salt River Reservation.64
The boy was a member of the Gila River Indian Tribe.65 Duro
was placed in custody and taken to stand trial in tribal court.66
However, at that time, the tribal court was limited to imposing
criminal penalties only up to six months imprisonment and a
$500 fine, because the court’s powers were regulated by federal
statute.67 The tribal court charged Duro with illegal firing of a
weapon on the reservation pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights
Act authorizing tribes to exercise jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians, and Duro moved to have the prosecution dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.68
After the tribal court denied his motion, Duro filed a petition
for habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona.69 The District Court granted the writ, and
held that if the tribe asserted jurisdiction over Duro, a
nonmember, it would violate the equal protection rights afforded
Indians by the ICRA.70 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that “if Congress had
intended to divest tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians they would have done so.”71 Judge Sneed,
dissenting from the panel opinion, argued that giving a tribal
court jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian would subject him to
“impermissible racial classification” and there would be a
“potential for bias” by a tribal court that consisted of Indians
with whom Duro was not necessarily affiliated.72 The panel
opinion and the dissenting opinion were subsequently revised;
however, during the revision period, the Eighth Circuit in
Greywater v. Joshua held that tribal courts did not possess
inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.73 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to help resolve
the conflict between the Eighth and Ninth Circuit decisions.74
The Supreme Court went on to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, concluding that “Indian tribes lack jurisdiction over

Id.
Id.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 681.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 684.
846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988).
Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1987), cert granted, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989),
and rev’d by 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
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persons who are not tribe members.”75
A.

Tribal Pandemonium

“‘Will you walk into my parlour’ Said a spider to a fly; ‘Tis
the prettiest little parlour that ever you did spy.’”76
The Supreme Court’s decision in Duro prompted outcry from
Indian tribes across the nation.77 Before the Duro decision, tribes
had been exercising criminal jurisdiction over all Indians,
including members and nonmembers, for over 200 years, and the
United States had recognized the exercise of this jurisdiction.78
Additionally, pursuant to the Indian Major Crimes Act,
the United States has asserted exclusive jurisdiction over certain
specified major crimes committed in Indian country by an Indian
against another Indian. This provision excludes state jurisdiction and
may also exclude concurrent tribal jurisdiction . . . .Section 1152 [the
Indian Country Crimes Act] establishes exclusive Federal jurisdiction
over all other general crimes except over crimes committed in Indian
country by an Indian against another Indian. The section recognizes
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribal government over such crimes.79

The decision in Duro, however, “established an arbitrary line
by differentiating between members and nonmembers instead of
American Indians and non-American Indians.”80 In reaching its
conclusion, the Duro court did not address the history of relations
between Indian tribes.81 Indian tribes quickly pointed out that
nonmember Indians play a sizeable role in the activities of other
tribes and in the lives of other Indians; nonmember Indians are
valued members of the community.82 In addition, the Arizona,
South Dakota, Nevada, North Dakota, and Montana legislatures
called upon Congress to reaffirm Indian tribal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians who commit misdemeanors on host
reservations.83
In response to this outcry, Congress used its plenary power
to amend the Indian Civil Rights Act. This amendment is
Duro, 495 U.S. at 685.
Mary Howitt, The Spider and the Fly, in SKETCHES OF NATURAL HISTORY 128, 128
(Effingham Wilson, London 1834).
77 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, American-Indian Law: United States v. Lara: Affirmation
of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over Nonmember American Indians, 83.7 MI B. J. 24
(2004).
78 S. REP. NO. 102-153, at 1 (1991).
79 Id. at 3. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
80 Fletcher, supra note 77, at 25.
81 S. REP. NO. 102-153, at 2 (1991).
82 Fletcher, supra note 77, at 25 (citing Carole Goldberg-Amberose, Of Native
Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 1123 (1994)).
83 S. REP. NO. 102-153, at 2 (1991).
75
76
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commonly called the “Duro fix” and restores the power of Indian
tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians for crimes committed on
their tribal land. The fix was supported by all of the tribes that
testified before Congress prior to Congress amending the Act.84
Through the Duro fix, Congress appeared to recognize that tribes
need more power over events that occur within their borders.
Indians who commit crimes on reservations of which they are not
members will be subject to criminal prosecution “by the host
tribal government in the same manner that they would be
subject to prosecution by the United States for major crimes
committed on Indian lands.”85 The Act, as amended, defines
“Indian” as “any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States as an Indian under section 1153, title 18,
United States Code [the Indian Major Crimes Act], if that person
were to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian country
to which that section applies.”86
Given the Congressional history and the plain language of
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 as amended, it seems
appropriate to conclude that Congress was reinvesting Indian
tribes with a power they already had: the power to prosecute all
Indians who commit crimes on tribal land. This was an
optimistic piece of legislation for Indian tribes in that they felt
that a right they once had as a result of their inherent sovereign
powers had been restored, and they would be able to enforce laws
against nonmember Indians that may not otherwise be enforced
in any other court.87
Around the time of the 1990 Duro decision and Congress’
subsequent fix, tribes began to put forth even more of a concerted
effort to make their voices heard, realizing if they did not, their
past efforts could be thwarted and subsequent pleas may fall on
deaf ears. Attempting to help themselves, the already-existing
Native American Rights Fund, in conjunction with the National
Congress of American Indians, formed the Tribal Supreme Court
Project, which allows tribes to pool their resources in order to
respond to the Supreme Court and Congress in a way which may
help give them a voice that others can hear.88 This effort
developed a network of “attorneys and academics to share legal
information and experience,” which has helped ensure that the
Supreme Court hears the best possible arguments in favor of the
84 Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overturned It: A
Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 768 (1993).
85 S. REP. NO. 102-153, at 2 (1991).
86 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1990).
87 Fletcher, supra note 77, at 25.
88 Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L.
REV. 5, 16 (2004).
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tribes when it opts to consider questions impacting Indian tribes
and tribal relations.89
III. THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY: UNITED STATES V. LARA
“In the spider-web of facts, many a truth is strangled.”90
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Duro, Congress
amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to reaffirm Indian tribes’
jurisdiction over all Indians. Congress’ actions raise several
important issues. First, by amending the Act to overrule the
Supreme Court, Congress presumed that the Duro decision was
based on federal common law rather than on constitutional
grounds.91 Second, by “reinvesting” tribes with a jurisdictional
power the tribes presumed they retained all along, Congress
acted as if tribes were not truly sovereign nations. Third,
Congress’ actions indicate that “tribes lost all power over persons
other than members at conquest and whatever powers tribes
have are the result of affirmative federal government grants.”92
This view of “delegated sovereignty” is an oxymoron: after all,
“Indians like all other citizens share allegiance to the overriding
sovereign, the United States.”93 Any other authority a tribe
possesses “comes from the consent of its members, and so . . .
marks the bounds of tribal authority.”94
A.

United States v. Lara: Background and Procedural History

1. District Court
Billy Jo Lara is a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians in North Dakota. He is married to a member
of the Spirit Lake Tribe and resided with his wife and children on
the Spirit Lake reservation in North Dakota.95 On June 13,
2001, while on the Spirit Lake reservation, Bureau of Indian
Affairs police officers arrested Lara for public intoxication.96
When the officers informed Lara that there was an exclusion
order prohibiting him from being on the Spirit Lake reservation,

89 Id. at 19 (citing Tracy Labin, We Stand United Before the Court: The Tribal
Supreme Court Project, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 695, 697 (2003)).
90 Paul
Eldridge,
available
at
http://www.worldofquotes.com/author/PaulEldridge/1/index.html.
91 See United States v. Lara, 294 F. 3d 1004, 1006 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Cooper v.
Aaron, 385 U.S. 1, 18, (1958)), reh’g en banc granted and rev’d by 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir.
2003), cert. granted and en banc opinion rev’d by 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
92 Resnik, supra note 7, at 115.
93 Skibine, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. at 775 (emphasis added).
94 Id.
95 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).
96 United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 636 (8th Cir. 2003).
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Lara struck one of them with his fist.97 The Spirit Lake tribe
charged Lara with five violations of the Sprit Lake Tribal Code,
including violence to a policeman.98 However, Lara had another
problem on his hands: Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) officers
are not only tribal officers, but also federal officers. Thus, when
Lara punched the BIA officer, he opened the door to federal
prosecution as well.99 This is precisely what occurred: a federal
grand jury indicted Lara for assault on a federal officer, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1).100 Lara moved to dismiss the
indictment, claiming that the federal charges violated the Double
Jeopardy clause101 and impermissible selective prosecution.102
The magistrate judge denied the motion, and Lara entered a
guilty plea on the condition that he could seek appellate review of
his motion to dismiss the indictment.103
2. United States Court of Appeals, Round 1: 2002
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Lara’s motion to
dismiss the indictment.104
The court cited the “separate
sovereigns” doctrine, under which a tribal court and the federal
government may prosecute a defendant for the same conduct if
the tribal court and the federal government draw their authority
from separate sources of power.105 Lara argued to the panel that
the separate sovereigns doctrine did not apply to his case because
the tribe that prosecuted him, the Sprit Lake Nation, and the
federal government both derive their power from the same
source: the United States Constitution.106 The government
argued the opposite: “the Spirit Lake Nation draws its authority
from retained sovereignty, [and] not from a Congressional

Id.
Id.
See Melissa L. Tatum, Symposium, Tribal Sovereignty and United States v. Lara:
Symposium Foreword, 40 TULSA L. REV. 1 (2004).
100 The language of the statute is as follows:
Whoever (1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or
interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while
engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties . . . shall, where
the acts in violation of this section constitute only simple assault, be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, and in all other
cases, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2005).
101 “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. amend V.
102 United States v. Lara, 294 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 2002).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1005-06.
105 Id. at 1006.
106 Id.
97
98
99
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delegation of power.”107
Therefore, the government argued that the Sprit Lake
Nation is a separate sovereign from the federal government and
both may prosecute Lara under the separate sovereigns
doctrine.108 The Court of Appeals agreed with the government,
explaining that, “Duro grounds its holding in federal common
law, not Constitutional law, because Duro discusses tribal
sovereignty without reference to the Constitution.”109
Accordingly, tribal sovereignty is governed by federal common
law, and the court “must defer to Congress.”110 Turning then to
Congress’ amendment of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), the
court concluded that Congress did not intend to expressly
delegate Congressional authority when it amended the ICRA;
instead, Congress’ intent was to recognize inherent tribal
power.111 Thus, since the Sprit Lake tribe drew its power from
retained sovereignty and the federal government drew its power
from a different source, Lara’s Double Jeopardy argument
failed.112
3. United States Court of Appeals, Round 2: 2003
After the Court of Appeals’ 2002 decision, Lara petitioned for
a rehearing en banc.113 The Court of Appeals granted Lara’s
petition and reversed the panel’s 2002 decision.114 The court
recognized that the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Enas, held
that Duro was a common law decision and thus Congress had the
power to override it by amending the Indian Civil Rights Act.115
The court also noted that the Enas court, “conceded that
sovereignty has ‘constitutional implications’” but nevertheless
decided that Duro was a common law decision.116 The Court of
Appeals went on to respectfully disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Enas, concluding instead that, “the distinction
between a tribe’s inherent and delegated powers is of
constitutional magnitude and therefore is a matter ultimately
entrusted to the Supreme Court. Absent a delegation from
Id. at 1006.
Id.
Id. at 1007. See also Duro, 495 U.S. at 676.
Lara, 294 F.3d at 1007.
Id. See also United States v. Weaselhead, 36 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913 (Neb. 1997),
quoting H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-261, at 3-4 (1991) (“Indian tribal-governments have
retained the criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians and [the Indian Civil Rights
Act amendment] is not a delegation of this jurisdiction but a clarification.”).
112 Lara, 294 F.3d at 1007.
113 United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
114 Id. at 640-41.
115 Id. at 639 (citing United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1115 (2002)).
116 Id. (quoting Enas, 255 F.3d at 673).
107
108
109
110
111
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Congress, a tribe’s powers are those ‘inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.’”117
4. United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide “whether Congress has the constitutional power to relax
restrictions that the political branches have, over time, placed on
the exercise of a tribe’s inherent legal authority.”118 The Court
decided that Congress does possess such power and Lara’s
conviction was therefore not barred by the Double Jeopardy
clause.119 At first glance, this decision seems to be somewhat of a
victory for tribes since it reaffirms the Duro fix, which allows
tribes criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians who
commit crimes on tribal land.120 The Court’s ultimate conclusion,
that tribes retain such criminal jurisdiction over non-member
Indians, is proper in that it does give tribes a small amount of
control over what happens within tribal borders. However, the
Court’s reasoning is flawed and a deeper examination leads to
the conclusion that both the Court and Congress wish Indian
tribes to remain virtually powerless to control relations, both
within their borders and outside of their reservations’ physical
boundaries.
In reaching its decision, the Court broke its rationale into six
elements: First, the Indian Commerce and Treaty Clauses gave
Congress plenary and exclusive authority to write and pass laws
Second, Congress had
with regard to Indian tribes.121
interpreted those “‘plenary’ grants of power as authorizing it to
enact legislation that restricts and” relaxes tribal powers.122
Third, Congress’ goal of altering “the degree of autonomy” of a
dependent sovereign that is not a State is a familiar legislative
objective.123 Fourth, Lara did not point to any language in the
Constitution suggesting that there is a limit on Congress’
“authority to relax restrictions on tribal” powers.124 Fifth, the
power that Congress “reinvested” in the tribes was similar to a
tribe’s powers to prosecute its own members, which makes the
117 Id. at 639 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S 313, 322(1978)) (emphasis
omitted).
118 Lara, 541 U.S. at 196.
119 Id. at 197, 210.
120 See Kevin K. Washburn, Lara, Lawrence, Supreme Court Litigation, and Lessons
from Social Movements, 40 TULSA L. REV. 25, 25, 28(2004).
121 Lara, 541 U.S. at 200. See also, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands and
Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71, (1979) (“Congress in the exercise of its
plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs . . . .”); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
122 Lara, 541 U.S. at 202.
123 Id. at 203.
124 Id. at 204.
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change at issue limited.125 Finally, the idea that Congress
possessed the power to relax restrictions on tribes’ inherent
prosecutorial authority was consistent with decisions in other
Supreme Court cases.126
B.

What’s Wrong With this Picture?

The doctrine of inherent sovereignty in federal Indian law
holds that “tribes are domestic dependent nations which may
exercise powers free of the strictures of the Constitution unless
The idea of inherent
limited by treaty or Congress.”127
sovereignty stems from the Marshall trilogy, which limited tribes
in two areas: the ability (or lack thereof) to convey land, and the
inability to deal as foreign nations to create treaties with the
United States.128 Essentially, “Native Americans were mere
occupiers with an individuality not subject to the laws of the
federal government but not completely independent of them
either.”129 The doctrine of inherent sovereignty is troubling in
and of itself because if tribes are sovereign, or were ever meant to
be treated as such, they should not be “mere occupiers,” or
“dependent nations,” which are subject to the mercy of Congress.
Indian tribes are not sovereign, autonomous, or independent;
Indian tribes are more accurately described as dependent
nations.
At issue in Lara is the separate sovereign doctrine, an
exception to the Double Jeopardy clause, in which multiple
governmental units may prosecute a defendant for the same
conduct if those governmental units draw their authority from
separate sources of power. The fundamental concept underlying
the separate sovereigns doctrine is “sovereigns.” If Indian tribes
draw their authority to prosecute Indians who commit crimes on
tribal land from a source other than their own inherent power,
then tribes are not sovereign.
The Supreme Court has previously held that when an Indian
tribe prosecutes its own members, it is acting as a separate
sovereign.130 The Court also found that when a tribe prosecuted
Id.
Id. at 205.
L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810 (1996).
128 Id.
129 April L. Seibert, Note, Who Defines Tribal Sovereignty? An Analysis of United
States v. Lara, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 393, 394 (2003/2004) (emphasis added).
130 Lara, 541 U.S. at 199. See also Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 318, 322-23 (1978) (a tribe’s
“sovereign power to punish tribal offenders,” while subject to congressional “defeasance,”
remains among those “‘inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished’” (emphasis added and deleted)).
125
126
127
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a member or a non-member Indian, its source of power to do so
was the tribe’s own inherent power; thus, it was acting as a
separate sovereign.131 However, by analyzing whether Congress
has the power to relax restrictions placed on the exercise of a
tribe’s inherent legal authority by political branches, one must
necessarily conclude that tribes are not regarded by either
Congress or the Supreme Court as sovereign, and they do not
possess any authority without either the Constitution or
Congress granting them such authority.
C.

Problems with the Lara Factors
1.

If Congress Has Plenary Power over Indian Tribes They
Cannot Be Independent Sovereigns
The Court reasoned that the Constitution, via the Indian
Commerce and Treaty Clauses, gives Congress “plenary and
exclusive” power to legislate with regard to Indian tribes.132
Second, Congress has interpreted those plenary grants of power
as authorizing it to enact legislation that restricts and relaxes
tribal powers.133 The plenary powers doctrine has been the
source of much agony for Indian tribes in the United States
“because of its potential to allow Congress to obliterate tribal
governments and treaties.”134
“[T]he sovereignty of the tribes is subject to exceptionally
great powers of Congress to regulate and modify the status of
tribes.”135 With regard to Indians, Congress has authorized
different policies at different times throughout United States
history.136 Aside from attempting to define Indian country
through the Indian Intercourse Act and subsequently through
steps to provide Indians with their own territories within states,
Indian tribes are also specifically mentioned in the Indian
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. This clause
gives Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign
Nations and among the several states and with the Indian
tribes.”137 The Indian Commerce Clause is derived from Article
IX of the Articles of Confederation, which stated that Congress
has “the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the
Lara, 541 U.S. at 199.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Edwin Kneedler, Indian Law in the Last Thirty Years: How Cases Get to the
Supreme Court and How They Are Briefed, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 274, 279 (2003).
135 William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62
WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1987).
136 Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.
137 Pommersheim, supra note 35, at 273 n.12.
131
132
133
134
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trade and managing all affairs with the Indians.”138
In the early years of the United States, Congress may have
been well served to interpret the Indian Commerce Clause as
granting to it the power to regulate all Indian affairs, despite the
fact that that the clause specifically grants power over only
Indian commerce. However, even with changing times and the
increased purchasing and political power of Indian tribes in this
country, the Court continues to interpret this clause as not only
giving Congress the power to regulate trade and commerce with
the tribes, but also as authority to legislate other issues with
regard to tribal affairs.139 The problem with this interpretation
is that “the treaty power does not literally authorize Congress to
act legislatively,” because it actually gives the President the
power and authority to make treaties.140
In 1871, Congress ended the practice of entering into treaties
with Indian tribes, but the Supreme Court nonetheless stated
that the statute terminating such power, 25 U.S.C. § 71, “in no
way affected Congress’ plenary powers to legislate on problems of
Indians.”141 Congressional policy today still purports to seek
“greater tribal autonomy within the framework of a ‘governmentto-government relationship.’”142 Yet, Congress has made major
policy changes with regard to Indians, even in the last fifteen
years, indicating that tribes are not as autonomous as the
government makes them out to be.143
If Congress has plenary and exclusive power to legislate with
regard to Indian tribes, then tribes are not truly sovereign,
because they do not possess the ultimate power to decide whether
they and their members will interact with the federal
government and various states. Because Congress gave Indian
tribes their recognized status within this country, it follows that
because of its plenary power to legislate with regard to tribes,
Congress has the power to extinguish tribal status. If a separate
body has the complete power to regulate tribal affairs, then tribes
are not sovereign; instead, they are dependent.

Id. (quoting the Articles of Confederation art XII).
Id. at 273.
Lara, 541 U.S. at 201.
Id. (quoting Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975)).
Id. at 202 (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. 22951 (April 29, 1994)).
In the past fifteen years, Congress has, among other things, enacted the Duro fix
and written multiple laws with regard to Indian gaming. With the increasing influence
tribes have on the communities in which they are situated, and therefore on the United
States itself, the government continues to step in and regulate Indian tribes.
138
139
140
141
142
143
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The Constitution Does Not Give Congress An
Enumerated Power To Alter Tribal Sovereignty
The Court in Lara noted that Congress’ statutory goal of
modifying the degree of autonomy of a dependent sovereign that
is not a State is a common legislative objective.144 Here again,
the Court states that Congress may modify a tribe’s degree of
autonomy within the United States. As the court in Wheeler
noted, Indian tribes enjoy a sovereignty that, “exists only at the
sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.”145
The Court refers to Indian tribes as “dependent sovereign[s],”
however, the terms contradict one another.
If a tribe is
dependent, then it is not truly sovereign.146 Since Congress may
write laws with regard to tribes’ internal affairs and jurisdiction,
as well as tribal relations with the government, then Indian
tribes are not entirely self-governing, even though they possess
the power to write laws with regard to certain aspects of internal
tribal affairs. Thus, they lack true sovereignty.
The Court states that Lara does not point to any explicit
language in the Constitution suggesting there is a limit on
Congressional authority to restrict or relax tribal powers.147
What the Court does not recognize is that tribal members cannot
point to explicit language in the Constitution with regard to
Congress’ authority on tribal affairs, because none exists. Justice
Thomas, although concurring in the judgment, notes that “[t]he
Court utterly fails to find any provision of the Constitution that
gives Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty.”148
There are only three places in which the term “Indian” appears
in the United States Constitution.149 First, it appears in Article I
regarding apportionment of the House of Representatives.150
Second, it appears in substantially the same form in the
Fourteenth Amendment, which superseded the Article I
reference. 151 Finally, the Indian Commerce Clause appears in
Article I.152
The Court concedes that the treaty power, which is often
referred to as a source of Congressional power over tribes, does
not literally give Congress the authority to legislate with regard

144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Lara, 541 U.S. at 202.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
See generally Lara, 541 U.S. at 193.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Resnik, supra note 7, at 80.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“[E]xcluding Indians not taxed.”).
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 3.
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to Indian affairs.153 Thus, “it provides no power to Congress, at
least in the absence of a specific treaty.”154 The treaty power
problem was prevalent even in the early 1900s, as illustrated in
Although Holland challenged the
Missouri v. Holland.155
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, it provides a good illustration of the
sovereignty debacle and constitutional problems that plague the
Lara decision and Indian affairs in general.
In Holland, Missouri filed a suit against the United States
game warden to enjoin the United States from trying to enforce
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and certain regulations made by
the Secretary of Agriculture on the grounds that the statute was
unconstitutional.156 The state argued that the statute interfered
with states’ sovereign rights because it provided for specified
close seasons and other protections for certain species of birds
that migrated between the United States and Canada.157 The
Supreme Court held that the Act was constitutional as the
treaty-making power was expressly delegated to the United
States under the Treaty clause158 and the Supremacy Clause.159
However, the decision tells the tale of a power struggle between
the states and the federal government that is analogous to the
situation facing Native Americans today.
Ironically, only six years prior to the Holland decision, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
in United States v. Shauver struck down as unconstitutional an
earlier federal statute regulating migratory birds because
Congress “attempted by itself and not in pursuance of a treaty to
regulate the killing of migratory birds within the States.”160
Despite the fact that the court in Shauver found that migratory
birds fell under the purview of matters that should be regulated
by the states, counsel for the Attorney General in Holland
argued that the government may exercise its powers within the
various states to the extent necessary, “although they may
involve an interference with what would otherwise lie exclusively
within the province of the state.”161 The Supreme Court accepted
Lara, 541 U.S. at 201.
Id. at 225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 431.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Holland, 252 U.S. at 432. See also United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (1914)
(“The court is unable to find any provision in the Constitution authorizing Congress,
either expressly or by necessary implication, to protect or regulate the shooting of
migratory wild game when in a state, and is therefore forced to the conclusion that the act
is unconstitutional.”).
161 Brief for Appellee, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 419 (1920) (No. 609).
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
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the government’s argument despite the fact that the government,
by deviously going through the back door and entering into a
treaty with Canada, sought to accomplish the same objective it
attempted to undertake in Shauver. Counsel for the Appellant in
Holland, recognizing the irony of the situation, aptly noted that
[i]f it had even been suggested that, although Congress had no power
to control the taking of wild game within the borders of any State, yet
indirectly by means of a treaty with some foreign power it could
acquire the power and by this means its long arm could reach into the
States and take food from the tables of their people, who can for one
moment believe that such a constitution would have been ratified?162

By the same token, even though the treaty power gives
Congress no authority to regulate the relationship between tribes
and the federal government absent a specific treaty, Congress
uses its long arm to delve into tribal affairs via the treaty power
and take from tribes that which it has no authority to seize:
sovereignty.
If Congress by means of a treaty can tell the people of a State when
and under what conditions they may take wild game which they own
in their collective sovereign capacity . . . then . . . they are states in
name only, and our government a very different government from that
presupposed and intended by the people who ratified the
Constitution.163

Similarly, with regard to tribal self-government, because
Congress bestowed upon itself the power to legislate with regard
to Indian affairs and did not leave that task to the tribes,
Congress does not view the tribes as sovereign.
Instead,
Congress views the tribes as dependent on the government to
regulate virtually every aspect of their affairs, something Indians
likely never pondered and the government, if it views tribes as
sovereign, should never have contemplated either.
3.

If Congress Has Power To “Reinvest” Tribes With
Prosecutorial Power, Then The Tribes Are Not
Sovereign
The Court states that the power that Congress reinvested in
the tribes is similar to a tribe’s powers to prosecute its own
members, which makes the change at issue limited.164 True, the
change at issue may be limited, but the overreaching powers of
the Supreme Court and Congress with respect to tribes are not.
The trouble with Lara is that the Court circumvents the issue
that has been at the core of Indian law and legislation since
162
163
164

Brief for Appellant, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 418 (1920) (No. 609).
Id.
Lara, 541 U.S. at 203.
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colonization: sovereignty. Simply because Congress reinvests
tribes with a power that they already had, or which is similar to
another power tribes possess, it does not necessarily follow that
Congress believes that tribes are sovereign. Limited power does
not equate to sovereignty.
The Court states that Congress’ power to relax restrictions
on tribes’ inherent prosecutorial authority is consistent with
other Supreme Court cases.165 While this may be the case, it still
does not mean that Congress and the Supreme Court view tribes
as separate sovereigns. This is evidenced by the fact that
Congress and the Supreme Court decide the laws of Indian
nations with regard to dealings with the government and nonIndians. In fact, Congress, through its 1990 amendment of the
Indian Civil Rights Act, dictated the way it believed Indians
should behave with respect to other Indians within Indian
territory. Although it is true that prior to the ICRA amendment
tribes had been exercising authority over nonmember Indians
who committed crimes on host tribal land, when Congress
reaffirmed that power, it was essentially dictating to Indian
tribes what they could or could not legally do with regard to
nonmember Indians. Congress, if it had chosen to do so, could
have refrained from amending the ICRA or amended it
differently, denying Indian tribes all power to prosecute
nonmember Indians who commit crimes on host territory.
D. Double Jeopardy
The Supreme Court found that Lara’s tribal prosecution and
subsequent federal prosecution for the same crime did not violate
the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.166 The
Double Jeopardy clause provides that no person shall “be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”167
Under normal circumstances, the Double Jeopardy clause would
bar Lara’s subsequent federal prosecution. However, there is an
exception to the double jeopardy clause: the separate sovereigns,
or dual sovereignty, doctrine. This doctrine holds that when an
individual violates the “peace and dignity” of two sovereigns by a
single act, that is, they violate the laws of two separate
sovereigns, there are two distinct offenses.168 Because the Lara
Court found that Indian tribes possess the inherent sovereignty
to prosecute nonmember Indians who commit crimes on host
Id.
Id. at 210.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Lara, 541 U.S. at 220 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474
U.S. 82, 88 (1985)).
165
166
167
168
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tribal land, the Court found that the Sprit Lake Nation was a
separate sovereign from the federal government. Thus, the dual
sovereignty doctrine permitted both the tribal and the federal
However, this conclusion was not without
prosecutions.169
criticism. Justice Thomas, although concurring in the judgment,
pointed out that confusion and mixed messages are still
abundant in tribal sovereignty cases. He noted two diametrically
opposed assumptions underlying sovereignty cases: First,
Congress possesses the power to “regulate virtually every aspect
of the tribes without rendering tribal sovereignty a nullity.”170
Second, the tribes somehow remain inherently sovereign with the
ability “to enforce their criminal laws against their own
members.”171
Over twenty years ago, the Supreme Court faced the same
dilemma in United States v. Wheeler. The Court noted that an
Indian tribe’s power to punish tribal members who commit
crimes on tribal land was among the inherent powers of Indian
tribes.
However, those powers were subject to “complete”
congressional “defeasance.”172 Even after Congress amended the
Indian Civil Rights Act in 1990, purporting to “reinvest” Indian
tribes with the inherent power to prosecute nonmember Indians,
Congress still holds the puppet strings. That is, Congress
ultimately has the power to take away tribes’ authority to
prosecute both member and nonmember Indians. Both the Court
and Congress appear to promote the idea that the Indians’ source
of power to prosecute criminals is a power derived from inherent
sovereignty. However, in reality, this power seems to be a
delegated federal power. Justice Kennedy, concurring in the
Lara judgment, points out that
[t]he terms of the [amended Indian Civil Rights Act] are best
understood as a grant or cession from Congress to the tribes, and it
should not be doubted that what Congress has attempted to do is
subject American citizens to the authority of an extraconstitutional
sovereign to which they had not previously been subject. The
relaxing-restrictions formulation is further belied by the involvement
of the United States in all aspects of the tribal prosecution of a nonmember Indian. . . . This does not indicate the sort of detachment from
the exercise of prosecutorial authority implicit in the description of
Congress’ Act as having relaxed restrictions.173

Adding an interesting twist to the plot, both Justice Souter
and Justice Scalia, who rarely share the same point of view,
169
170
171
172
173

See Lara, 541 U.S. at 210.
Id. at 215 (Thomas, J. concurring).
Id.
Wheeler, 435. at 322.
Lara, 541 U.S. at 213 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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dissented. Justice Souter wrote that the majority’s reasoning
implied that allowing Congress to amend the Indian Civil Rights
Act was “more like the delegation of lawmaking power to an
administrative agency, whose jurisdiction would not even exist
absent congressional authorization.”174 An application of the
Double Jeopardy doctrine turns on just how far inherent
jurisdiction extends.175
Although Indian tribes do have limited powers to punish
offenders who commit crimes within tribal territory, that power
is still scrutinized by the ever watchful eye of the federal
government. Congress and the Supreme Court still maintain
that Indian tribes are separate sovereigns, and therefore, when
an Indian commits a crime on tribal land, both the tribal and
federal governments may prosecute him without offending the
Double Jeopardy clause. Yet, if Congress has the plenary
authority to disinvest tribes of that power by making it illegal to
prosecute tribal members or nonmembers for crimes they commit
on tribal land, then it does not seem to follow that Indian tribes
are separate sovereigns. If this is the case, then tribal power is
delegated federal power, and the Fifth Amendment should bar
the Court from twice putting Lara in jeopardy.
There is no way to deny that the United States government
has extensive power over Indian tribes. Realistically speaking,
because tribes are reliant on the federal government, Congress’
continual interference with tribal affairs and jurisdictional issues
is at odds with the tribes’ dependent status and most definitely
at odds with their independent status. When Congress enacted
the Duro fix to reinvest tribes with powers they possessed from
their inception, Congress gave powers to the tribes that
dependent bodies cannot really possess.
Hence, Congress
confused the situation even further with its “largely rhetorical”
notions of indigenous nation sovereignty and independence.
IV. CONCLUSION
“The bird a nest, the spider a web, man friendship.”176
Congress undeniably has the power to regulate Indian tribes,
controlling a multitude of tribal affairs, both externally, and, to
some extent, internally. However, this leads to the conclusion
that Indian tribes are not sovereign bodies and probably have not
been since colonization. The United States government and
Id. at 227 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id.
William Blake, available at
Blake/1/index.html.
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Indian tribes alike have made progress in leaps and bounds since
both bodies experienced a head-on collision during the nation’s
inception. However, the government, while insisting that Indian
tribes are sovereign nations, continuously appears to disregard
their sovereignty by enacting laws that impact the tribes. If the
Supreme Court and Congress believe that Indian tribes are
sovereign, they should treat them as such.
Tribes have made countless efforts to improve their status
within this country. Unfortunately, sometimes those efforts do
not succeed. Making improvements, while partially the tribes’
responsibility, should also be a priority for the government. The
Court and Congress should take the initiative to recognize that
when they refer to Indian nations as sovereign, they are
perpetuating a false sense of independence and ability to
completely self-govern. Our nation’s law and policymaking
bodies should reveal their true stance on how they view Indian
nations.
Although there is no easy solution to such a deeply-rooted
historical issue, recognizing that there is a problem, and
identifying the source of that problem is at least a first step.
Although “[t]he case before us must be considered in light of our
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a
hundred years ago,”177 it still appears that Congress and the
Supreme Court would rather continue giving lip service to tribal
sovereignty than come to a resolution that allows the government
to remain powerful but also allows tribes to preserve an
independence and heritage that, if destroyed, could drive a stake
through the rich traditions that are at heart of this nation.
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